Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications

Philosophy, Department of

7-1-1974

Wittgenstein's Tractatus: Some Metaphilosophical
Considerations
Howard Kainz
Marquette University, howard.kainz@marquette.edu

Published version. Journal of Thought, Vol. 9, No. 3 ( July 1974): 172-178, Stable URL. © 1974
Caddo Gap Press. Used with permission.

Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications/Department of
Philosophy
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; but the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript.
The published version may be accessed by following the link in the citation below.

Journal of Thought, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 1974): 172-178. Publisher Link. This article is © Caddo
Gap Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in ePublications@Marquette. Caddo Gap Press does not grant permission for this article to be
further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Caddo
Gap Press.

WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS: SOME
METAPHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Howard P. Kainz
In the case of many philosophers, a study of their earlier works could lead to a misconception of
their doctrine. For example, if we concentrated on Kant's early work, OBSERVATIONS ON THE
FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME, we would be led to think that Kant attributed
aesthetic feeling to psychological makeup and to temperamental, sexual, and racial differences.
If we concentrated on Hegel's early writings, we would think that the final, "absolute" synthesis
of reality was to be found in religious consciousness. If we took Marx's 1844 Manuscripts too
seriously, we would be led to believe that he looked forward to some ultimate
goal "beyond" communism, which would manifest the real structure of
human society. And we could make similar observations regarding the
earlier Wittgenstein, the logical atomist, as compared with the later Wittgenstein of the "word games".

In all such cases, however, the misconceptions that would result from such a
study would be misconceptions specifically as to "what was the doctrine of
Kant on aesthetics," "what was the doctrine of Hegel on the Absolute, " etc.
In other words, they would be misconceptions resulting from a distorted
view of the significance of some "early work" in the context of the
development of a particular philosopher, or in the context of the
development of the history of philosophy.
But if we put aside questions of temporal and historical philosophical
development, to examine these early works on their own merits-- this can
be useful--especially if it is a relatively self-consistent, systematic
presentation, and especially if it is set in the context of the question,
"does this early work tell us anything about reality?" For, after all, the
main purpose of philosophy is not to determine what philosophers have
opined, but to try to say something about the way things are. And the
world view in an early work can be just as useful for that purpose as a later
one. Not necessarily "truer." But very likely it would be inappropriate to
apply the terms "true" or "false" to a world view "qua" world view. For
almost any world view seems to contain, at least implicitly, some general
criteria for determining truth and falsity--criteria which could not be
applied to itself without "begging the question." If we had a world view of
world views, "then" we might be able to discuss them in terms of truth or
falsity. But inlieu of any such hypothesis, we shall hypothe- size that, just
as the mountain climber can get a view of the land- scape from the east
or the west, or just as the artist can get a view of his model from the
front or the side--so also any philosopher at any time in his development
can present what is "truly" a "view" but not necessarily more true or more
false than other views--even the later views of the same philosopher.
But is not a specific world view to be judged "false" when it gets into
inevitable self-contradictions? For example, in Wittgenstein's case, the
propositions of the TRACTATUS, "insofar as they do not represent the
world itself by way of elementary propositions, but are precisely 'about'
the relationship between language and reality, lie outside the scope of
assertions that have sense and therefore are '·nonsensical. ‘”1 But then again,
Kant's views in his first CRITIQUE about space and time and the categories-if they add anything to our knowledge--might well be taken as instances of "a
priori synthetic" judgments in metaphysics; but this would make the whole
enterprise of the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (namely, determining whether a

priori synthetic judgments are possible in metaphysics) rather superfluous.
Similarly, the Thomistic view that truth is "conformity of the mind to
objective reality" raises the question as to whether the mind that makes this
statement is conformed to the objective reality of truth.
Perhaps, then, it is inevitable that any elaborately structured philosophical
system should come now and then to the limits of its "viability". And perhaps
it is these limits that supply the necessary and sufficient impetus to other
world views, which can remedy the defects of the former (without, however,
failing to avoid some "sui generis" defects of their own). 2
But different world views are not necessarily different in all respects. And
indeed, it is the recurrence of similar ideas in strikingly different philosophical
contexts that is one of the most interesting "phenomena", from a
metaphilosophical point of view. Should not these convergences, as they turn
up, merit our special and serious consideration, precisely "because" two or
more very disparate philosophers have enunciated them? The answer to this
question, of course, lies outside any particular philosophical system.
Rather than trying to answer this question, this paper will simply take its
departure from the world-view presented in Wittgenstein's TRACTATUS,
and point out some possibilities of parallels in the world views of some
other philosophers--namely, Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. In this way it will
be supplying some of the "facts" that one would have to consider before
trying to answer the metaphilosophical question brought forward in the
preceding paragraph.
Wittgenstein, of course, situates philosophy exclusively in the realms of
logic and language. However, if we treat these realms as just one "sphere
of discourse" about philosophy, and make proper allowance for
differences in perspective, these are some of the parallels or convergences
that turn up:

Vis a vis Plato....
Wittgenstein says that number, "qua" number, is outside the do- main of
logic and logical forms (4. 128). For logic in itself is a do- main which is
transcendent, i.e. , transcends all experience and all bodies of doctrine,
including mathematics (6.13). Logic is a completely a priori system (5.
4541, 5. 552), which contains in itself no numbers. The propositions of
mathematics are an exemplification of logical method (b.2); but this

relationship is not convertible. That is, logical propositions do not exemplify
mathematics or number. And in fact it would even be a misnomer to speak
of any logico-philo- sophical realm as a "monism" or a "dualism" (4.128).
Although Plato does not describe the relationship of number to the Ideas
in any extant dialogue, it is well-known that he considered mathematical
ideas to constitute a kind of intermediate world of Ideas--separate from
sensible reality, but inferior to Ideas of Forms in the strict sense. Thus, as
Aristotle presents Plato's doctrine in METAPH. I, 6--the causative, separate
Numbers are stable and eternal realities, which are just a single degree
inferior to the Forms, insofar as they allow a multiplication of similarities,
while the Forms are pure abstract unity, prior to all multiplicity.
Thus, Plato seems to anticipate in a mythical or symbolic fashion the
hierarchical relationship to be found between form-and-number in
Wittgenstein's logico-philosophical reconstruction of reality (in which a priori
propositions of logic take the place of a priori Platonic Forms).

Vis a vis Aristotle....
One thing that is hard to understand in the TRACTATUS is how a
proposition, which is an assertion of a fact, and a picture of that fact as an
existent state of affairs--could itself be a fact (2.141).
If a proposition depicts by means of its logical form, and if logical form
itself constitutes the limits of our cognized world, it would not seem that
this logical picture could itself be numbered among those facts, the sumtotal of which "constitutes" the world. It certainly is not outside the world.
If in addition it is not at the limits of the factual world, but within, it
would then seem to be capable of being analyzed in terms of truth possibilities, and in terms of constituent atomic objects, or termini of
intrinsic possibilities of relationships. Thus in this case we could have a
science of those forms depicting physical phenomena; i.e., a metaphysics.
It seems to have been some such consideration which led Aristotle in his
PHYSICS to the intimation that, having uncovered the intelligible form of
objects, we might have a higher science about the intrinsic properties of
form itself. 3 And this led to the METAPHYSICS.
Wittgenstein, it seems, had no such intimations. Or if he did have some
such intimation, perhaps this is one major reason why he eventually
abandoned the method of the TRACTATUS for the approach of the
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. But, within the context of the TRACTATUS
alone, it does seem strange that he should designate the propositions

mirroring the world as "facts"--unless he considered them merely in terms
of their sensuous signs or vocal enunciations. In the latter case,
Wittgenstein's theory of depiction and logical form would seem to be
something definitely on the side of the mystical.

Vis a vis Hegel. . . .
If one remembers to make due allowances for an extreme difference in
contexts, he may also notice one striking parallel to be found in the worldview of Wittgenstein and the world-view of Hegel.
Wittgenstein, in a kind of rambling fashion, proposes for himself in the
course· of the TRACTATUS, the following problem: How can we express the
general form of all propositions--a proposition of propositions which would
summarize in symbolic form all the types and variations of propositions
which are conceivable. He introduces this problem in 5.47-5. 472, and follows
it up in various forms in 5. 5,5.502, and 6-6. 01. He concludes that the
general form of propositions could be expressed as the operation of a series
of negations effected upon elementary propositional variables. In other
words, the general form of all (molecular) propositions could be expressed as
the successive negation of the (atomic) propositions from which they are
constructed.
Hegel, in the LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, criticizes Spinoza for
constructing an incomplete system, in which God, the "causa sui," is the only
positive reality in the world. If only Spinoza had recognized that God became a
positive reality through the "negation of negation" (negating Himself by
production of the world)--then he could have elaborated a system which woul4
have given due respect to human freedom and individuality, as the "negative" of
the Absolute Being of God.4 Hegel, however, does not just criticize Spinoza, but
attempts to present his own "Absolute" as the "negation of negation." For
example, the first "Absolute" which Hegel arrives at in his PHENOMENOLOGY
is "die Sache Selbst"--a particular type of individual consciousness which has
negated objectivity, and then negated this negation to produce a living, categorical
synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity;5 and the second "Absolute" which he
arrives at is Absolute Knowledge,6 a supreme philosophical vantage point which
has resulted from the individual's negation of himself (through culture and
history), and the negation of this negation, resulting in a conscious reconciliation
of the individual with his total milieu. Similarly, in Hegel's ENCYCLOPEDIA, the
Absolute Idea, the Absolute Concept, and Absolute Spirit are likewise
established as "negations of negation." Thus we might say that--just as
Hegel's SACHE SELBST is the "fact of facts" produced by successive negations, and

just as his Absolute Knowledge is the consciousness of consciousness produced
by successive negations -- so also Wittgenstein's formula for the general form of
propositions, [𝜏̅, 𝛮𝜁̅ ]′ (𝜂), is for all practical purposes, a proposition of
propositions, or an expression of expressions, an "absolute" which he arrives at in
the domain of logic, by the process of successive negation.
In conclusion, we might observe that the inference that one draws from the
above-mentioned parallels will depend, in large-part, on one's value system.
If, for example, one has ontological or metaphysical leanings, he might say that
Wittgenstein, purportedly confining himself to the realms of pure logical
analysis, inadvertently and covertly encounters problems, now and then, which
bear on the ontological constitution of reality.
If, on the other hand, a) one is of an anti-metaphysical persuasion, but b) goes
beyond mere allegations of "nonsense" to recognize some such parallelism--he
might in congruence with his own value system, judge that Plato, in his doctrine
of the World of Forms, was covertly or symbolically or mythically referring to
relationships among propositions about the world; that Aristotle, in asking
whether every form had to be considered in relationship to matter, was asking,
in terms of his own mythical projections, whether every fact was a
"representation" of a state of affairs; and that Hegel, in producing his Absolute
through the negation of negations, was showing in a symbolic or mythical way
that the general logical form encompassing all statements about reality would
have to be a negation of negations.
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